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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

STATE V. COATES: STATEMENTS MADE TO A MEDICAL
CARE PROVIDER ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE
STATEMENTS MADE FOR MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR
TREATMENT HEARSAY EXCEPTION WHEN THE
DECLARANT WAS UNAWARE OF THE PURPOSE OF THE
STATEMENT.
By: Neal Desai

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that statements made to a
nurse practitioner during examination were not admissible under the
hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or
treatment because the declarant did not know the statements were
being made for medical diagnosis or treatment. State v. Coates, 405
Md. 131, 950 A.2d 114 (2008). More specifically, the court stated that
there is a lack of reliability in such statements, and therefore, the
hearsay exception is inapplicable. Coates, 405 Md. at 147,950 A.2d at
124.
In September 2002, Kimberly Jenkins ("Jenkins") was involved in
a romantic relationship with Frederick Roscoe Coates ("Coates").
When away from home, Jenkins often left Coates alone to take care of
her daughter, Jazmyne T. ("Jazmyne"). Approximately one year later,
it was discovered that Coates had sexually abused Jazmyne. Jazmyne
was examined and interviewed by Heidi Bresee ("Bresee"), a nurse
practitioner, to obtain a patient history and to conduct an external
vaginal examination. During the interview, Jazmyne told Bresee,
among other things, that Coates "put his private inside her private."
After the interview and examination, Jazmyne asked Bresee, "Are you
going to go out and find him now?"
On October 7, 2004, the Grand Jury for Montgomery County
indicted Coates on counts of second-degree rape and other related
offenses. Coates filed a motion in limine, asking the circuit court to
exclude Bresee's testimony. The court denied the motion, and Bresee
testified at trial. On May 25, 2005, the jury for the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County found Coates guilty. Coates appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which reversed, ruling that
Bresee's testimony was improperly admitted and prejudicial. The
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State filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, and the court granted the petition.
The hearsay exceptions derive from the common law theory that
certain out-of-court statements have a minimal risk of inaccuracy and
untrustworthiness. Coates, 405 Md. at 141, 950 A.2d at 121 (citing 5
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
1420 at 251 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)). The Court of Appeals of
Maryland addressed the admissibility of Bresee's testimony under the
hearsay exception in Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(4). Coates, 405 Md. at
141, 950 A.2d at 120. Under the Maryland rule, statements made for
medical treatment or diagnosis are admissible if the declarant
describes medical history, symptoms, pain, or the general character of
the cause as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in
contemplation of treatment. Coates, 405 Md. at 141,950 A.2d at 121
(citing Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4)). This exception does not apply to cases
where a non-treating physician is merely preparing to testify on the
patient's behalf. Coates, 405 Md. at 142, 950 A.2d at 121 (citing
Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 124,353 A.2d 910,
914-15 (2003); Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 563, 571, 168 A.2d
501,505 (1961)).
The court agreed with the intermediate appellate court, in that
Bresee, in addition to having a cognizable medical reason for
interviewing Jazmyne, also had a forensic purpose. Coates, 405 Md.
at 143, 950 A.2d at 123. The court stated that the existence of dual
medical and forensic purposes for an examination does not
automatically disqualify an otherwise admissible statement under
Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(4). Id. at 143, 950 A.2d at 122 (citing
Webster v. State, 151 Md. App. 527, 546, 827 A.2d 910,921 (2003)).
However, the court conclusively noted that the overarching purpose
Bresee had was investigatory in nature rather than related to medical
concerns. Coates, 405 Md. at 143,950 A.2d at 122.
Next, the court looked to whether the declarant believed there was a
medical purpose for the examination. Id. at 144, 950 A.2d at 122.
The court stated that the facts do not support a finding that Jazmyne
would have understood that she was being seen for medical treatment
or diagnosis because the interview with Bresee took place fourteen
months after the last sexual-abuse incident and three weeks after her
disclosure of the incident to her mother. Id. Further, the court
determined that most eight-year-olds cannot distinguish "emergent
circumstances or medical necessity in the absence of any medical
complaints or symptoms." Id. at 144, 950 A.2d at 122. Finally, the
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court found that Jazmyne's inquiry about whether Bresee would find
Coates implied that Jazmyne did not understand that there was a
medical or dual purpose for the examination. Id.
The court distinguished this case from other significant Maryland
cases. Id. at 144, 950 A.2d at 123. In one such case, the victim had
the requisite motive for providing sincere and reliable infonnation
because the victim's statement was "pathologically gennane" to
treatment by a hospital nurse in an emergency setting. Id. (citing
Webster, 151 Md. App. at 546,827 A.2d at 920). The court found the
case at bar distinguishable because there was no emergency situation
that would render Jazmyne's statements reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment. Coates, 405 Md. at 145, 950 A.2d at 123. The
court rejected the State's argument that Coates' identity was
"pathologically gennane" to diagnosis or treatment because statements
to a medical practitioner about the identity of the person who caused
the injury are unlikely to be considered by the declarant as related to
diagnosis or treatment. Id. at 146, 950 A.2d at 123.
The court then compared the case at hand to another case where the
intennediate appellate court reasoned that at the age of two, a
declarant does not understand the purpose of a doctor's questions and
therefore, does not have the self-interested motive to tell the truth that
underlies the hearsay exception. Id. (citing Cassidy v. State, 74 Md.
App. 1, 27, 536 A.2d 666, 678-79 (1988)). Similarly, here the court
stated that it is unlikely that Jazmyne, a seven-year-old at the time of
her statements to Bresee, would have known that Coates' identity was
medically relevant in detennining her exposure to a sexually
transmitted infection. Coates, 405 Md. at 147, 950 A.2d at 124. The
court concluded that the record indicates Jazmyne's motive was to find
Coates because he had not been apprehended. Id.
By issuing a writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
recognized the importance of this decision regarding the hearsay
exception embodied in Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(4). Coates clarifies
Maryland law in establishing that where the declarant is unaware that
the success of the diagnosis and treatment depends on the accuracy of
his or her disclosure, the reliability of his or her infonnation is no
longer presumed. As a result, under Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(4),
lawyers in Maryland will now have a greater burden of showing that
the declarant made his or her statement with the knowledge that the
success of treatment was dependent on the declarant's accurate
disclosure.

